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SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA: WHY 
TRADITIONAL COMPANY SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICIES 
ARE NOT ENOUGH AND HOW TO FIX IT 
Kristen N. Coletta* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the year 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) received 12,860 complaints of sexual harassment,1 illustrating that 
sexual harassment is ever present in our society.  Compounding this issue, 
the rise of social media use by both individuals2 and businesses,3 and its 
undoubted prevalence in our society, raises concerns that sexual harassment 
on social media is the workplace sexual harassment issue of the present and 
future.  Despite increased use of social media for personal and business 
purposes, regulators and courts have given little guidance as to how 
employers should deal with social media sexual harassment claims.4  Indeed, 
case law is especially unclear about when employers will be liable for sexual 
harassment between employees that occurs on social media.5 
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Lafayette College.  I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Dean Timothy Glynn, for his 
helpful guidance and support in writing this Comment.  I would also like to express my 
gratitude to my family and friends, especially my parents, John and Muriel Coletta, for their 
unconditional love and support throughout this process. 
 1  Charges Alleging Sexual Harassment FY 2010 – FY 2015, U.S. EEOC, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2017). 
 2  Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005–2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 8, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/ (finding that 
sixty-five percent of adults use social media as of 2015, which is “a nearly tenfold jump in 
the past decade”). 
 3  Nora Ganim Barnes & Ava M. Lescault, The 2011 Inc. 500 Social Media Update: 
Blogging Declines as Newer Tools Rule, Center for Marketing Research at University of 
Massachusetts Dartmouth (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.umassd.edu/media/umassdartmouth
/cmr/studiesandresearch/2011_Inc500.pdf (finding that while business blogging has declined, 
other social media use by businesses on websites like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn 
increased between 2008 and 2011). 
 4  See infra Section III.C.1. 
 5 Id. 
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The first purpose of this Comment is to address the rise of sexual 
harassment and clarify when an employer is liable for such conduct.  The 
second purpose of this Comment is to give employers guidance in creating 
effective social media sexual harassment policies in an effort to minimize 
social media sexual harassment in the first place and help employers avoid 
liability when it does occur.  Part II explains what “traditional workplace 
harassment” is, discusses early workplace harassment case law, examines 
when employers may be held liable for the conduct of employees, and 
considers when an employer may be liable for employee conduct outside of 
work.  Part III focuses on the rise of social media use, discusses its effect in 
the workplace, and examines case law where courts consider social media 
harassment as evidence in sexual harassment claims.  Part IV analogizes 
other areas of the law in an effort to help determine when employers may be 
liable for social media sexual harassment.  Part V argues that company social 
media policies and company sexual harassment policies are each insufficient 
on their own to combat social media harassment and thus, employers must 
enact policies that specifically address such harassment.  Part V also provides 
policy-drafting guidance so that employers can draft effective anti-
harassment policies. 
II. THE DECLINE IN “TRADITIONAL WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT” 
“”Throughout this Comment, the term “traditional workplace 
harassment” refers to sexual harassment that takes place somewhere other 
than the Internet.  Sexual harassment can include “unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment 
of a sexual nature.”6  The harasser and the victim can be either male or female 
and the conduct need not necessarily be sexual in nature.7  For example, 
“offensive remarks about a person’s sex” can result in a sexual harassment 
claim.8  Unlawful sexual harassment does not include minor teasing, isolated 
minor incidents, or offhand comments; rather, the harassment becomes 
illegal “when it is so frequent or severe that it creates a hostile or offensive 
work environment or when it results in an adverse employment decision 
(such as the victim being fired or demoted).”9  “The harasser can be the 
victim’s supervisor, a supervisor in another area, a co-worker, or someone 
who is not an employee of the employer, such as a client or customer.”10  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) makes it an unlawful 
 
 6  Sexual Harassment, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sexualharassment.
cfm (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
 7  Id. 
 8  Id. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id.  
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employment practice to discriminate against someone on the basis of “race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”11  Discriminatory practices under 
Title VII include, among other things, harassment on the basis of sex.12 
A. Early “Traditional Workplace Harassment” Cases and Title VII 
Claims 
The District Court for the District of Columbia in Willams v. Saxbe,13 
was the first federal court to recognize sexual harassment as unlawful 
employment discrimination.14  The issue presented was whether a 
supervisor’s retaliatory action based on an employee’s denial of the 
supervisor’s sexual advances constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.15  
After denying her supervisor’s sexual advances, Diane Williams’ supervisor, 
William Saxbe, began humiliating her and treating her poorly.16  He refused 
to give her notice of her work obligations, consider her proposals and 
recommendations, or recognize her as a competent professional.17  In 
addition, he gave her unwarranted reprimands.18  On September 11, 1972, 
Saxbe gave Williams notice of his intention to terminate her, and on 
September 21, 1972, she was given notice of termination, effective the next 
day.19 
Taking the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint as true, the court 
found that the conduct amounted to unlawful employment discrimination 
because there was an “artificial barrier” to employment created for one 
gender and not the other, despite both genders being similarly situated.20  The 
court rejected the defendant’s argument that discrimination would be 
unlawful only if the policy or practice targeted a specific characteristic, 
peculiar to one’s gender.21  Instead the court stated, “a rule, regulation, 
practice, or policy [ ] applied on the basis of gender is alone sufficient for a 
finding of sex discrimination.”22  The court agreed with the Administrative 
Hearing Examiner who found the defendant did not meet his burden to show 
 
 11  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(b) (West Year). 
 12 Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications
/fs-sex.cfm (last visited Oct. 24, 2017). 
 13   413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev’d on other grounds, Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 
1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 14  Jeremy Gelms, High-Tech Harassment: Employer Liability Under Title VII for 
Employee Social Media Misconduct, 87 WASH. L. REV. 249, 252 n.15 (2012). 
 15  Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657. 
 16  Id. at 655–56. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. at 655. 
 20  Id. at 657–58.  
 21  Williams, 413 F. Supp.  at 658. 
 22  Id. (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)). 
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that the harassment was unconnected to the termination.23  It was therefore 
reasonable to infer that the termination was not due to the employee’s poor 
performance, but was instead a retaliatory act.24 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson25 was the first United States Supreme 
Court case to recognize workplace sexual harassment as actionable under 
Title VII, and the first time the Court recognized a cause of action for sexual 
harassment because of a hostile work environment.26  Ms. Vinson, a bank 
employee, brought a Title VII claim alleging her supervisor made unwanted 
sexual advances towards her.27  In fear of losing her job, she complied with 
his sexual demands and had intercourse with him multiple times over the 
course of her four years of employment.28  On some occasions, the advances 
resulted in rape.29  The bank had no notice of the sexual harassment because 
Vinson never utilized the bank’s complaint procedure out of fear of losing 
her job.30 
The employer claimed it was not liable because Title VII prohibits 
discrimination claims with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges” of employment and the statute therefore allows recovery only 
when there is “tangible loss” of an “economic character.”31  The Court 
rejected this argument and noted that in Title VII, “[t]he phrase ‘terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces a Congressional intent ‘to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in 
employment.”32  Accordingly, the Court concluded that Title VII claims are 
not limited to claims resulting in economic injury (“quid pro quo” claims), 
but can also include harassment that results in a hostile or abusive work 
environment (“hostile environment” claims).33  The Court further explained 
that for sexual harassment to be actionable, the harassment must be “severe 
or pervasive” under the totality of the circumstances so as “to alter the 
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.”34  This is the current standard for Title VII claims.35 
 
 23  Id. at 662. 
 24  Id. at 656.  
 25  477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 26  Brief for Petitioner, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-
1979). 
 27  Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id.  
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. at 64. 
 32  Id. (citing L.A. Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
 33  Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65–66. 
 34  Id. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).   
 35  See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (reaffirming the 
Meritor standard, which has not since been overruled). 
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The Court has declined to definitively decide the issue of employer 
liability in cases where the employer is not on notice of conduct.36  
Nonetheless, the Court rejected the lower court’s finding that employers are 
automatically liable for harassment carried out by their supervisor 
employees, based on inferred Congressional intent to place some limits on 
employer liability.37  At the same time, the Court noted that the existence of 
a policy, and the employee’s failure to utilize the policy, does not necessarily 
exempt the employer from liability.38 
Thereafter, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,39 the Supreme Court 
established a standard for evaluating what type of conduct may be viewed as 
unlawful harassment.40  The claim in Harris involved sexual harassment 
carried out by the president of the defendant company, Forklift Systems, 
against a female manager, Ms. Harris.41  In reversing the decision of the 
District Court of Tennessee, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Meritor standard that 
actionable harassment under Title VII must be “severe or pervasive” under 
the totality of the circumstances, and that severity and pervasiveness have 
both objective and subjective elements.42  The Court found that the lower 
court erred in looking to whether the sexual harassment affected Harris’s 
psychological well-being or whether it led her to suffer injury.43  Writing for 
the majority, Justice O’Connor reasoned that “Title VII comes into play 
before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown” and, therefore, 
the Meritor standard does not have a psychological harm requirement.44 
B. When is an Employer Liable for Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace? 
Whether an employer will be liable for a hostile work environmentor 
any unlawful harassmentperpetrated by one of its employees depends first 
on whether that employee is the victim’s supervisor or co-worker.45  Two 
 
 36  Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id.  
 39  510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 40  See id. at 21–22. 
 41  Id. at 19. 
 42  Id. at 21. 
 43  Id. at 22. 
 44  Id. (stating that conduct violates Title VII if it is “so severe or pervasive that it create[s] 
a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national 
origin”). 
 45  Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Sexual 
Harassment by Supervisors, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html
#_ftn10 (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) [hereinafter “Enforcement Guidance”]. 
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landmark Supreme Court cases decided on the same day,46 Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth47 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,48 established 
that employers are subject to vicarious liability for unlawful harassment by 
their supervisors.49  The Court’s holding in each case is based on two 
principles: first, that an employer is responsible for the acts of its supervisors 
based on agency principles, and second, that Congress enacted Title VII to 
motivate employers to create anti-harassment policies and to encourage 
employees to avoid or limit the harm from harassment.50 
Under Faragher/Ellerth, an employer is strictly liable for sexual 
harassment by a supervisor towards an employee if the supervisor created a 
hostile work environment for the employee (by sexually harassing him/her) 
and took a tangible employment action (TEA)51 against the employee.52  A 
TEA is an action that “constitutes a significant change in employment status, 
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 
different responsibilities, or a significant change in benefits.”53  If the alleged 
harasser did not take a TEA, the employer may raise an affirmative defense 
by establishing that (a) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly 
correct any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) the victim unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities or to 
avoid harm otherwise.54 
 
 46  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). 
 47  Id. at 765 (holding that, “[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized 
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or 
successively higher) authority over the employee,” if the harassment results in the supervisor 
materially changing the victim’s employment position (i.e. taking “tangible employment 
action”)).  The employer can raise an affirmative defense to liability, but only if the 
harassment does not result in tangible employment action.  See id.  The defense must be 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence and “comprises two necessary elements: (a) that 
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage 
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.”  Id. 
 48  524 U.S. 775, 777 (1998) (same holding as Ellerth). 
 49  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777; see also Enforcement Guidance, 
supra note 45. 
 50  Enforcement Guidance, supra note 45. 
 51  Note that a TEA is similar to an adverse employment action, but is a term of art used 
specifically in sexual harassment law.  TEA is defined above. 
 52  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760–61; see also Watson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 01 C 
1517, 2003 WL 21799965, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2003) (“[I]f Watson is able to demonstrate 
that [the alleged harasser] created an actionable hostile environment and took tangible 
employment actions against her, she establishes that Home Depot is vicariously liable for [the 
alleged harasser’s] actions and the inquiry is at an end.”). 
 53  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. 
 54  Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also Watson, 2003 WL 21799965, at *7 
(stating that “[i]f . . . Watson demonstrates that she endured an actionable hostile environment 
but fails to establish that [the harasser] took any tangible employment actions against her, 
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For example, in Watson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,55 the Northern 
District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Home Depot 
because Watson’s alleged harasser, Terrell, did not take a TEA against her, 
and the company also successfully established the Faragher/Ellerth 
affirmative defense.56  Among other things, Watson argued that her 
termination for exceeding her medical leave was a TEA.57  The court, 
however, correctly held that the harassing supervisor must carry out the TEA 
for a successful sexual harassment claim.58  At the time of her termination, 
Terrell was already transferred to, and working in, another store.59  Thus, he 
could not have been responsible for her termination.60 
The court next found that Home Depot successfully met each prong of 
the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense test.  Home Depot satisfied the first 
prong because it had an in depth anti-harassment policy and grievance 
mechanism; the company satisfied the second prong because it illustrated 
that despite its anti-harassment policy and grievance procedure, Watson still 
unreasonably failed to report the harassment when it occurred.61 
In contrast to a supervisor harassment claim, if the harassment 
perpetrator is the victim’s co-worker, the employer cannot raise the 
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense and is liable only if it knew or should 
have known of the misconduct, and did not take immediate and appropriate 
action to correct it.62  In a case of co-worker harassment, an employer cannot 
claim lack of knowledge of the harassment as a defense if there is evidence 
that the employer did not clearly inform its employees of its complaint 
procedures.63 
 
 
 
Home Depot may raise the affirmative defense”). 
 55  2003 WL 21799965, No. 01 C 1517 (N.D. Ill. August 1, 2003). 
 56  Id. at *10. 
 57  Id. at *7. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Watson, 2003 WL 21799965, at *9–10. 
 62  29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1985); see, e.g., Perry v. Ethan Allen, 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (finding that “[w]hen harassment is perpetrated by the plaintiff’s coworkers, an 
employer will be liable if the plaintiff demonstrates that the employer either provided no 
reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 63  Enforcement Guidance, supra note 45, at n.58 (citing Perry, 115 F.3d at 149 (“When 
harassment is perpetrated by the plaintiff’s coworkers, an employer will be liable if the 
plaintiff demonstrates that ‘the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint 
or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.’”)). 
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C. Can an Employer Ever be Held Accountable for Conduct Outside 
the Workplace? 
Before determining whether the employer is liable for conduct outside 
the workplace, a court must first determine that unlawful harassment has 
occurred.64  In Title VII hostile work environment claims, courts consider 
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a plaintiff has a 
claim.65  Generally, the circuit courts consider harassment that occurs outside 
the four walls of the workplace when the harassment is severe or pervasive 
enough to have consequences at work.66  The First,67 Second,68 Seventh,69 
and Eighth70 Circuits have all considered harassment that occurred away 
from work in the totality of the circumstances.71 
In Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., the First Circuit admitted evidence of 
events occurring outside the workplace because the conduct “outside of work 
help[ed] explain why she was so frightened of [the harasser] and why his 
constant presence around her at work created a hostile work environment.”72  
In Ferris v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the Second Circuit found the airline liable 
for a rape that happened while flight attendants were in a hotel booked by 
the employer for an overnight stay between flights.73  The Ferris court stated 
 
 64  Id. 
 65  Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986); see also 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11(b) (1985) (“In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, 
the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, 
such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents 
occurred.  The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the facts, 
on a case by case basis.”). 
 66  See generally Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 409–10 (1st Cir. 2002); Ferris 
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001); Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 
983 (7th Cir. 2008); Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., 253 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 
2011); Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 510–11 (5th Cir. 2003); Sprague 
v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).  
 67  Crowley, 303 F.3d at 409–10 (admitting evidence in a claim against plaintiff’s 
employer for a co-employee’s conduct, including following plaintiff home, encounters in a 
bar, and breaking into her home, reasoning that the “non-workplace conduct” was relevant to 
illustrate the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment and also explained plaintiff’s fear 
of the co-worker). 
 68  Ferris, 277 F.3d at 135 (finding an airline liable for a rape that happened while flight 
attendants were in a hotel booked by the employer for an overnight stay between flights). 
 69  Lapka, 517 F.3d at 983 (finding that “harassment does not have to take place within 
the physical confines of the workplace to be actionable; it need only have consequences in 
the workplace”); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 715 (7th Cir. 2006) (same). 
 70  Dowd, 253 F.3d at 1101–02 (finding that “[t]he touchstone for a Title VII hostile work 
environment claim is whether the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 
employment and create an abusive working environment”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 71  See Gelms, supra note 14, at 260–62. 
 72  Crowley, 303 F.3d at 409–10. 
 73  Ferris, 277 F.3d at 135. 
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that while the rape was considered to have occurred in a work environment 
within the meaning of Title VII due to the special circumstances, it was a 
close call.74  The court implied that other claims that are more disconnected 
from the workplace may not be considered the same way.75 
In Lapka v. Chertoff, the Seventh Circuit admitted evidence of 
harassing events outside the workplace by merely stating that “harassment 
does not have to take place within the physical confines of the workplace to 
be actionable; it need only have consequences in the workplace.”76  Finally, 
in Dowd v. United Steelworkers of America, the Eighth Circuit admitted 
evidence of harassing events outside the workplace because the events 
happened in close proximity to the workplace (outside the building on the 
workers’ drive in).77  The court reasoned that the harassment was arguably 
“perpetrated with the intention to intimidate and to affect the working 
atmosphere inside the plant,” and, therefore, a reasonable jury could find that 
the events contributed to creating a hostile work environment.78 
On the other hand, the Fifth79 and Tenth80 Circuits have come close to 
finding conduct outside the workplace was “sufficiently pervasive or severe 
to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working 
environment,”81 but have not yet had a case with facts to support this 
conclusion.  In Gowesky v. Singing River Hospital, the Fifth Circuit reasoned 
that because Gowesky never came back to work after being on disability, the 
alleged harassment that occurred over the phone could not have had 
consequences in the workplace.82  In Sprague v. Thorn Americas, the Tenth 
Circuit reasoned that the most severe instance of sexual harassment would 
not be considered because it occurred at a wedding, not in the workplace, 
and the other alleged harassment occurred sporadically over sixteen 
months.83  Therefore, the conduct taken together was not sufficiently severe 
 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 77  Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., 253 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 2011).  
 78  Id. 
 79  Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 510–11 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing 
to extend the workplace beyond the four walls because all of the alleged conduct happened 
over the phone or in writing while plaintiff was on disability leave and she never returned to 
work). 
 80  Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997) (refusing to 
consider most severe incident of sexual harassment in a series of events over sixteen months 
because it took place at a wedding reception and not at work).  
 81  Gowesky, 321 F.3d at 509 (internal quotations omitted); see also Gelms, supra note 
14, at 263. 
 82  Gowesky, 321 F.3d at 510–11. 
 83  Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1366. 
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or pervasive enough to have consequences in the workplace.84 
While the circuits may apply a similar test and admit evidence of sexual 
harassment on social media if it creates effects in the workplace, the answer 
is unclear.  The courts have not given much, if any, thought to the issue thus 
far. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE WORKPLACE 
A. Background About Social Media’s Effect in the Workplace 
Social media is a broad term that encompasses many different types of 
communication tools, including collaborative projects, blogs, content 
communities, social networking sites, virtual game worlds, and virtual social 
worlds.85  Among the various forms of social media, social networking sites 
have become the most popular forum for sexual harassment and have been 
defined by social scientists as “web-based services that allow individuals to 
(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) 
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) 
view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within 
the system.”86  Social networking sites have become a main source of 
Internet communication in recent years.  Thus, many of the Internet 
communications that result in sexual harassment have occurred on social 
networking sites (“social media” for the purposes of this paper) and have 
resulted in increased potential for employer liability for their employees’ 
actions on these sites.87  Businesses are also incorporating the social media 
world into the workplace by creating business-related social media accounts 
and websites for their businesses.88 
 
 
 
 
 84  Id. 
 85  Gelms, supra note 14, at 264–65. 
 86  Id. at 265 (citing Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: 
Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 210–11 
(2007)). 
 87  Alison Cain & Katherine O’Brien, Facebook Status Update: Employer is. . .Sued: 
How Internet Harassment Could Lead to a Change in Status, LEEDS BROWN LAW P.C., 
http://www.lmblaw.com/media/in-the-news/articles/internet-harassment/ (last visited Oct. 
19, 2016) (stating that, “[a]s a result of the proliferation of communication platforms the 
potential for employer liability is increasing for the actions of their employees, even when 
distinctly outside of the workplace”).  
 88  Nick Clayton, Business Joins the Party, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703712504576244622146113118; see also 
Cain & O’Brien, supra note 87 (stating that as early as May 2006, the social networking site, 
Facebook.com, had over 1,000 work networks). 
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A recent Pew Research Center study found that employees, both full-
time and part-time, regularly use social media at work.89  The study found 
that of their 2,003 person sample size, 34% use social media while at work 
to take a mental break; 27% use it to connect with friends and family outside 
while at work; 24% use it to make or support professional connections; 20% 
use it to get information that helps them solve work problems; 17% use it to 
build or strengthen personal relationships with coworkers; 17% use it to learn 
about someone they work with; 12% use it to ask work-related questions to 
someone outside their organization; and 12% use it to ask those questions to 
people within their organization.90  These numbers illustrate the proliferation 
of social media, and thus, the obvious effect that its existence and use has on 
the workplace. 
B. The Rise of Social Media Workplace Harassment 
There is currently no data on the rate of social media workplace sexual 
harassment over time.  There is, however, abundant evidence that social 
media use is on the rise, and that social media harassment is indeed a 
significant issue.91  The Pew Research Center has found that, as of 2015, 
65% of American adults use at least one social networking site.92  This 
number steadily increased from 46% in 2010.93  Similarly, online harassment 
has proven to be a significant problem, with 40% of Internet users being 
victims of varying degrees of online harassment as of 2014.94  While there is 
no data on the rate of social media harassment over time, one can logically 
infer a rise in online workplace harassment from the increase in social media 
use and the high percentage of online harassment experienced by Internet 
users. 
The rise of social media use in the employment realm creates more 
portals for employees to communicate with each otherinevitably resulting 
in more communication, and thus, more harassment.95  An article in TIME 
 
 89  Nicole B. Ellison, Cliff Lampe, & Kenneth Olmstead, Social Media and the 
Workplace, PEW RESEARCH CTR.  (June 22, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/06/22
/social-media-and-the-workplace/.  
 90  See id.  Note that data does not add up to 100% because some participants fell into 
more than one category. 
 91  See id; see also Perrin, supra note 2 (finding that 65% of adults now use social 
networking sites); see also, Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
(Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/22/online-harassment/ (finding that 
73% of adults have seen someone be harassed on the Internet, and about 40% have 
experienced Internet harassment themselves). 
 92  Perrin, supra note 2.  
 93  Id.  
 94  Duggan, supra note 91. 
 95  See generally Ellison, Lampe & Olmstead, supra note 89; see also Duggan, supra note 
91. 
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magazine about Internet “trolling” explains that the Internet was once simply 
a portal for the free flow of information, but has now turned into a portal for 
hatred.96  “Trolls” are “people who relish in online freedom” at the expense 
of others.97  Joel Stein, the author of the aforementioned TIME article, 
explained that psychologists attribute the rise of Internet hatred to “‘the 
online disinhibition effect,’ in which factors like anonymity, invisibility, a 
lack of authority, and not communicating in real time strip away the mores 
society spent millennia building.”98 
Though “trolling” (as used in the article) is not analogous to social 
media sexual harassment in the workplace, comparisons can be drawn.  
While anonymity may not translate to social media sexual harassment 
connected to the workplace, a lack of communicating in real time probably 
does.  It is much easier to sexually harass a coworker if you do not have to 
do it to his or her face.  As quoted directly from an online “troll” herself, 
“[t]he Internet is the realm of the coward.”99  Furthermore, employees may 
be under the false assumption that there are less or no consequences of social 
media harassment because it is less directly connected to the workplace.100  
As a result, employees may view the Internet as a safe space to carry out the 
harassment that is prohibited at work. 
C. How Social Media Harassment Changes Employer Liability 
As discussed above, in traditional workplace harassment claims, 
employers are liable for almost all harassment carried out by their 
supervisory employees, and they are liable for co-worker harassment if the 
employer had reason to know of the misconduct and failed to take immediate 
and appropriate action to remedy it.101  Even if harassment occurs outside of 
the four walls of the workplace, the employer will usually be liable if the 
harassment has some connection to the workplace.102  Harassment with a 
connection to the workplace includes for example, if a woman is harassed at 
a work-sponsored happy hour or if her supervisor follows her home from 
 
 96  Joel Stein, Tyranny of the Mob, TIME MAG., Aug. 2016, at 27. 
 97  Id.  
 98  Id.  
 99  Id. at 32 (quoting a “troll” who has made the author of this article, Stein, her target in 
the online trolling world).  
 100  Ena T. Diaz, Social Media: A Growing Concern for Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace, ATT’Y AT LAW MAG., http://www.attorneyatlawmagazine.com/miami/social-med
ia-a-growing-concern-for-sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace-2/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2016) 
(explaining that the links between private and work-life have been blurred by the use of social 
media, particularly when colleagues are “friends” on Facebook). 
 101  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 102  See supra Part II.A.3. 
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work.103 
Employer liability for social media sexual harassment is more difficult 
because it is unclear when the use of social media is connected to the 
workplace such that the employer should be liable.104  Some scholars have 
argued that courts should include evidence of social media harassment in the 
totality of the circumstances for Title VII claims when the employer has 
derived a “substantial benefit” from the social media source on which the 
harassment occurs.105  Whether the employer derived a “substantial benefit” 
from the social media depends on “whether the social media was sufficiently 
integrated into the employer’s business operations to qualify as a logical 
extension of the workplace.”106  If the employer derives a substantial benefit 
from the social media, courts can then consider the social media harassment 
in the claim.107  This could include harassment through an employer-run 
bulletin, an employee’s business social media account, or even an 
employee’s personal account used to promote his or her employer or his or 
her employer’s products.108 
Courts often consider harassment that occurs on social media in Title 
VII hostile work environment claims.  The case Blakey v. Continental 
Airlines,109 concerned a pattern of sexual harassment in the workplace and 
continuing harassment through defamatory and gender-based statements 
made on an electronic bulletin board used by employees of Continental 
Airlines.110  Continental employees were required to use the forum to access 
their flight schedules and assignments.111  Continental argued that (1) it did 
not have a duty to remedy the situation because operation of the online 
bulletin was outsourced to another company, and (2) since the Internet 
cannot be considered “in the workplace,” it did not have a duty to monitor 
the forum.112  The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this argument and 
instead framed the issue as whether “an employer, having actual or 
 
 103  Compare Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 409–10 (1st Cir. 2002); Ferris v. 
Delta Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001); Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983 
(7th Cir. 2008); Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., 253 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 2011), 
with Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 510–11 (5th Cir. 2003); Sprague 
v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).  
 104  See generally, Gelms, supra note 14 (exploring the question of when harassment that 
occurs on social media should be included in the “totality of the circumstances” for a Title 
VII sexual harassment claim). 
 105  Id. at 251. 
 106  Id. at 273. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
 109  751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000). 
 110  Id. at 542–43. 
 111  Id. at 544. 
 112  Id. at 545. 
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constructive knowledge that co-employees are posting harassing, retaliatory, 
and sometimes defamatory, messages about a co-employee on a bulletin 
board used by the company’s employees, [has] a duty to prevent the 
continuation of such harassing conduct[.]”113 
The court explained that if the online forum harassment had happened 
in an employee lounge, there would be little doubt that it would be 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and 
to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”114  The 
pivotal question then became whether an online electronic bulletin board was 
equivalent to a bulletin board in a pilot’s lounge or a work-related place.115  
The court reasoned, severe or pervasive harassment in a work-related setting 
which creates a pattern of harassment in the workplace “is sufficiently 
related to the workplace that an informed employer who takes no effective 
measures to stop it, ‘sends the harassed employee the message that the 
harassment is acceptable and that the management supports the harasser.’”116 
Blakey lays out a standard for employer liability that aligns with federal 
law.117  The finding that a workplace harassment claim can arise from 
harassment on a work-related online bulletin board illustrates that courts are 
not hesitant to expand the workplace to the Internet, especially when the 
conduct creates hostility within the four walls of the workplace.118 
In Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Services, Inc.,119 Amira-Jabbar, a black 
female, brought a hostile work environment claim against her former 
employer after a co-worker posted a photo of her at a work-related event on 
his personal Facebook page.120  Another co-worker posted a comment that 
the plaintiff claimed was racially motivated harassment.  The plaintiff’s 
complaint cited this incident, as well as other incidents of harassment in the 
workplace.121 
The Puerto Rico District Court found that the social media incident was 
relevant enough to be considered in the totality of the circumstances because 
it was sufficiently work-related,122 but failed to explain the reasoning behind 
 
 113  Id. at 542. 
 114  Id. at 548–49. (citing Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 448 (N.J. 1993)). 
 115  Blakey, 751 A.2d at 549. 
 116  Id. at 550 (citing Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 463). 
 117  See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (establishing that 
conduct violates Title VII if it is so “severe or pervasive” as “to alter the conditions of [the 
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment”); see also Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (reaffirming the Meritor standard). 
 118  Blakey, 751 A.2d at 550. 
 119  726 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.P.R. 2010). 
 120  Id. at 81. 
 121  Id.  
 122  Id. at 85–86. 
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this determination.123  Despite this finding, the court dismissed Amira-
Jabbar’s claim because the few incidents that occurred were “‘offhand 
comments’ or ‘isolated incidents’ that [were] insufficient to create an abusive 
environment.”124  The court also found that the remedial action taken by the 
employer when the sexual harassment was brought to its attention satisfied 
the “prompt and appropriate action” standard, and the employer was 
therefore not liable.125  This action included both an investigation and a 
review of the company’s harassment policies with all of its employees.126 
Though Amira-Jabbar did not deal with sexual harassment, the EEOC 
takes the position that the same basic standards apply in all types of 
harassment cases.127  As in Amira-Jabbar, employers must take “prompt and 
appropriate action” when notified of harassment to avoid liability for the 
actions of their employees.128  That action must include a review of company 
harassment policies.  In the days of advanced technology and widespread use 
of social media, harassment policies specific to social media are crucial to 
both informing employees of the legality of their actions and reducing 
employer liability for those actions. 
IV. USING OTHER AREAS OF LAW TO PIN DOWN EMPLOYER LIABILITY 
AND POLICY-DRAFTING NECESSITIES 
A. Can Employers Be Held Liable for Sexual Harassment Under the 
NLRA? 
Since workplace sexual harassment claims fall under Title VII, there is 
no specific provision of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act) 
dealing with sexual harassment in the workplace.129  While the NLRA does 
not address sexual harassment, and so the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB or the Board) does not regulate sexual harassment, it is still well 
 
 123  Gelms, supra note 14, at 271. 
 124  Amira-Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 85–86. 
 125  Id. at 86. 
 126  Id. at 87. 
 127  Enforcement Guidance, supra note 45; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1985) (“The 
principles involved here continue to apply to race, color, religion or national origin.”); EEOC 
Compliance Manual Section 615.11(a) (BNA 615:0025), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.pdf (“Title VII law and agency principles will 
guide the determination of whether an employer is liable for age harassment by its supervisors, 
employees, or non-employees.”). 
 128  Amira-Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 87; see also Enforcement Guidance, supra note 45 
(stating that an employer will be liable for harassment from a co-worker unless it can show 
that it took “immediate and appropriate corrective action” upon employee complaint). 
 129  Jerome B. Kauff & Laura L. Putney, Sexual Harassment Within the Context of the 
National Labor Relations Act, KAUFF MCGUIRE & MARGOLIS, LLP, http://www.kmm
.com/articles-9.html#anchor292162 (last visited Oct. 17, 2016). 
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within the jurisdiction of the NLRB to determine whether company policies 
adequately balance employer interests with employee rights under the 
NLRA.130  Thus, the NLRB’s position on social media policies provides 
important guidance on drafting an effective social media sexual harassment 
policy. 
B. The NLRB’s Minimal Drafting Guidance on Social Media 
While the NLRB does not regulate sexual harassment, it “has taken a 
strong stance in favor of privacy,”131 in terms of social media policies.  This 
strong stance makes it clear that company social media policies cannot 
violate employees’ section 7 rights under the NLRA to engage in “concerted 
activity”132 and cannot violate section 8(a)(1) by interfering, restraining, or 
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7.133  
Section 7 allows employees to “engage in concerted activity for collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”134  The NLRB gives the 
following guidance on defining concerted activity: 
Activity is “concerted” if it is engaged in with or on the authority 
of other employees, not solely by and on behalf of the employee 
himself. It includes circumstances where a single employee seeks 
to initiate, induce, or prepare for group action, as well as where an 
employee brings a group complaint to the attention of 
management. Activity is “protected” if it concerns employees’ 
interests as employees.135 
A company’s social media policy violates section 8(a)(1) where the 
policy reasonably tends to “chill employees in the exercise of their [s]ection 
 
 130  See generally Belinda R. Gross, Section 7 of the NLRA, AM. BAR ASS’N, YOUNG 
LAWYERS DIV., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_
201_practice_series/section _7_of_the_NLRA.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2016). 
 131  Symposium, Sexual Harassment Versus Workplace Romance: Social Media Spillover 
and Textual Harassment in the Workplace, 27 ACAD. OF MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 187, 195 
(2013). 
 132  The NLRB and Social Media, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-
sheets/nlrb-and-social-media (last visited Oct. 27, 2016) (describing memos from the NLRB’s 
General Counsel which advised employers on whether to act on questionable employee social 
media activity and advised not to act in situations where the employees were engaging in 
“protected concerted activity”). 
 133  Gross, supra note 130; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012). 
 134  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012); Joseph Domenick Guarino, Drafting Advice: Developing 
Social Media Policies, LEXISNEXIS: LEXIS ADVISOR PRACTICE JOURNAL (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/the-journal/b/lpa/archive/2015/11/25/dra
fting-advice-developing-social-media-policies.aspx.  
 135  Interfering with Employee Rights (Section 7 & 8(a)(1)), NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/
rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employee-rights-section-7-8a1 (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2016).  
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7 rights.”136  In regards to employee social media use outside the workplace, 
the Board has held that employees will be protected under sections 7 and 
8(a)(1) when activity online (even activity disparaging the employer) 
discusses wages, hours, union membership, and anything else that could 
reasonably be considered “concerted activity” or is for the “mutual aid or 
protection” of other employees.137  The Board has even found that an 
individual’s activity may be “concerted” if he acts on his own, “but in a way 
that may benefit the group.”138  Protecting employees’ section 7 rights is 
important for regulating sexual harassment policies as well.139  The same 
rules protecting concerted activity between employees also apply to 
company sexual harassment policies.140 
While concerted activity protection is not relevant for social media 
sexual harassment, the Board’s guidance on social media policies creates the 
presumption that the Board views social media as connected to the 
workplace and that its social media regulations naturally extend to this area 
of the law.  Unfortunately, this recognition still does not help determine when 
employers will be liable for social media sexual harassment. 
C. A Useful Comparison—School District Liability for Cyber-
Bullying 
While the NLRB’s guidance does not help determine employer 
liability, an analogy to school district liability for cyber-bullying may prove 
useful in getting to that determination. While social media sexual harassment 
jurisprudence began moving towards the possibility of utilizing a 
“substantial benefits” test,141 cyber-bullying jurisprudence has moved 
towards a different standard—the “substantial disruption” test.142 
 
 136  Gross, supra note 130. 
 137  Id. (citing Three D, LLC v. NLRB, No. 14-3284, 2015 WL 6161477 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(upholding a Board decision finding that employees were wrongly terminated based on 
section 7 and section 8(a)(1) for complaining, on Facebook, about their employer’s failure to 
withhold the proper amount of payroll taxes). 
 138  Id. (citing Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 59 (Mar. 31, 2015) (finding that an employee 
was wrongly terminated for posting to his personal Facebook page, a “profanity-charged rant” 
about disrespectful treatment by an assistant manager).  The end of the post at issue in Pier 
Sixty read, “Vote Yes for the Union!”  362 N.L.R.B. 59, at *2. 
 139  See Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations 
Board 10 (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/NLRB%20Handbook%
20Guidance.pdf. 
 140  See id. (stating that “anti-harassment rules cannot be so broad that employees would 
reasonably read them as prohibiting vigorous debate or intemperate comments regarding 
Section 7-protected subjects”). 
 141   Gelms, supra note 14, at 251.  
 142  Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 571–72 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)) (quotations and alterations 
omitted) (holding that a school can discipline student speech when it “disrupts 
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In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,143 the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals adopted the “substantial disruption” test for determining when a 
school district can legally discipline a student for cyber-bullying outside of 
school hours.144  The case involved a high school senior, Kara Kowalski, 
who created a Myspace.com page that targeted a fellow classmate, Shay 
N.145  After Kowalski invited about one hundred classmates to follow the 
page, Shay found out about the webpage and her parents filed a harassment 
complaint with the school.146  Shay did not want to attend classes that day, 
noting that she felt very uncomfortable about sitting in class with the students 
who commented on the page.147  The school determined that Kowalski 
created a “hate website” in violation of the school policy against 
“harassment, bullying, and intimidation.”148  After the school punished her, 
Kowalski filed a lawsuit against the school system “alleging that the 
administration’s decision to punish her for the MySpace web page 
constituted a violation of the First Amendment.”149 
Adopting the “substantial disruption” test from Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District,150 the Fourth Circuit held that the 
school district was authorized to discipline Kowalski “because regardless of 
where her speech originated . . . the speech was materially and substantially 
disruptive in that it ‘interfer[ed] . . . with the schools’ [sic] work [and] 
colli[ded] with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let 
alone.’”151  While the United States Supreme Court has not yet adopted the 
“substantial disruption” test for school cyber-bullying, jurisprudence and 
scholarship suggest that it is the best, and most effective, test.152 
 
classwork, creates substantial disorder, or collides with or invades the rights of others”). 
 143  652 F.3d 565. 
 144  Christopher A. Sickles, Bridging the Liability Gap: How Kowalski’s Interpretation of 
Reasonable Foreseeability Limits School Liability for Inaction in Cases of Cyberbullying, 21 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 241, 242 (2012) (citing Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567; Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 513).  
 145  Id. at 249. 
 146  Id. at 250. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Id. 
 149  Id. 
 150  393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 151  Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573–74 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 508); see also Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 395 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(applying the Tinker rule and holding that “conduct by a student, which materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others, is not immunized 
by the First Amendment, [and] applies when a student intentionally directs at the school 
community speech reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and 
intimidate a teacher, even when speech originated off campus”). 
 152  Sickles, supra note 144, at 259; see also Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572; Bell, 799 F.3d at 
395. 
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Imagine applying the substantial disruption test in the sexual 
harassment social media realm.  Under a substantial disruption test, a 
harassing event that occurs on social media—and therefore technically, 
outside the workplace—would be considered in the “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis when the harassment creates a “substantial 
disruption” or has a substantial effect in the workplace.  This would achieve 
the same goal as the Meritor “severe and pervasive” standard for traditional 
workplace sexual harassment.  The Meritor test holds an employer liable 
only when the sexual harassment is so “severe or pervasive” under the 
totality of the circumstances “to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] 
employment and create an abusive working environment.”153 
Similarly, the “substantial disruption” test would look only to social 
media sexual harassment that is so severe and pervasive that the effects spill 
over into the workplace (the employer’s unquestionable jurisdiction) and 
alter the victim’s terms and conditions of employment.  If the harassment 
occurring on social media is so severe that it affects the victim’s work life, 
then it is so “severe and pervasive” that the employer should know about the 
harassment and, therefore, has an obligation to address it.  For these same 
reasons, the test also aligns with the view adopted by the First,154 Second,155 
Seventh,156 and Eighth157 Circuits, as discussed in Section II.A.3. 
The “substantial disruption” test is much more practical than the 
“substantial benefits” test because the former covers more necessary ground 
than the latter.  Under the “substantial benefits” test, someone who is 
severely harassed by a supervisor or co-worker in an online forum would not 
 
 153  Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing Henson v. Dundee, 
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
 154  Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 409–10 (1st Cir. 2002) (admitting evidence 
in a claim against plaintiff’s employer for a co-employee’s conduct, including following 
plaintiff home, encounters in a bar, and breaking into her home, reasoning that the “non-
workplace conduct” was relevant to illustrate the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment 
and also to explain plaintiff’s fear of the co-worker). 
 155  Ferris v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding the airline 
liable for a rape that happened while flight attendants were in a hotel booked by the employer 
for an overnight stay between flights).  In Ferris, the court implied that while these events are 
considered to have occurred in a work environment within the meaning of Title VII due to the 
special circumstances, it was a close call, and other claims that are more disconnected from 
the workplace may not be considered the same way.  Id.  
 156  Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that “harassment does 
not have to take place within the physical confines of the workplace to be actionable; it need 
only have consequences in the workplace”); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 715 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (same). 
 157  Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., 253 F.3d 1093, 1101–02 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding 
that “[t]he touchstone for a Title VII hostile work environment claim is whether the workplace 
is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule or insult that is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working 
environment”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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have a claim even if the harassment created severe effects in the workplace, 
unless that online forum provided a substantial benefit for the employer.  The 
substantial benefits test is therefore simply far too narrow.  In contrast, this 
situation would clearly fall within the bounds of the “substantial disruption” 
test as long as the harassment creates severe effects in the workplace. 
Under the “substantial disruption” test, the scope of employer liability 
may extend far beyond the “four walls of the workplace”—it is a broad test.  
While this broad test is not ideal for employers, it is the most effective test 
offered by both scholarship and jurisprudence to date.  A broad scope of 
employer liability makes in-depth social media policies that much more 
important.  Broad liability means that policies must discuss prohibited 
conduct within the workplace, as well as conduct that could create employer 
liability outside the four walls. 
V. HOW TO AVOID EMPLOYER LIABILITY WHEN EMPLOYEES ENGAGE IN 
HARASSMENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
As illustrated by Blakey and Amira-Jabbar, the presence of social 
media undoubtedly blurs the line of separation between the workplace and 
the online world.158  These cases also show that employees likely do not 
realize that the line is so thin or that what they say on online forums can 
result in workplace discipline for themselves and civil liability for their 
employers.159  Thus, enacting effective policies specifically addressing 
sexual harassment that occurs on social media is the logical next step for 
companies to not only educate their employees, but also to minimize the 
effects of, and liability for, social media harassment.160  The policies that 
employers have in place to combat traditional harassment are in most cases 
insufficient to deal with harassment that occurs on social media because 
these policies do not deal with the question of whether conduct on social 
media will be deemed connected to the workplace.  General company social 
media policies are also insufficient because there is some confusion about 
 
 158  See generally Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000); Amira-Jabbar 
v. Travel Servs., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.P.R. 2010). 
 159  See generally Blakey, 751 A.2d 538; Amira-Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d 77. 
 160  Kristen Bellstrom, 25 Years After Anita Hill, Have We Made Progress on Sexual 
Harassment?, FORTUNE (Apr. 19, 2016, 12:22 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/04/19/anita-hill-
sexual-harassment-eeoc/ (Jenny Yang, the EEOC Chair, explains that one of the biggest 
factors leading to litigation is employers’ failure to communicate their harassment policies); 
Amy Blackstone, Fighting Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, SCHOLARS STRATEGY 
NETWORK, http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/brief/fighting-sexual-harassment-
workplace (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (stating that employers must “spell out clear policies 
against harassment and make known the consequences of violations for harassers”); Ellison, 
Lampe & Olmstead, supra note 89 (finding that far less employees use social media at work 
when their employers have a policy prohibiting it). 
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what constitutes a sound company social media policy.161 
The social media policy confusion stems from the NLRB’s failure to 
give explicit guidelines about what language companies’ social media 
policies need to use in order to avoid violating their employees’ rights under 
the NLRA.162  Company policies targeting social media activity tend to be 
very broad163 for a number of reasons, but a key motivator is the widespread 
fear that restricting employees’ social media use will indirectly restrict their 
section 7 rights to engage in concerted activity under the NLRA.164  While 
the problems with drafting regular social media policies are an interesting 
issue, they are beyond the scope of this Comment.  The point is that the broad 
language used in many company social media policies is not sufficient to 
target and minimize sexual harassment.165 
Furthermore, scholars have found that workers whose employers have 
at-work social media policies are less likely to use social media for personal 
reasons while on the job.166  Of those whose employers have social media 
policies, 30% use social media to take a mental break from work as opposed 
to 40% of those whose employers do not have policies.167  This data 
illustrates that at-work policies are effective and allows for the inference that 
social media policies specific to sexual harassment will contribute to 
minimizing its pervasiveness. 
A. Does Creating a Sexual Harassment Social Media Policy Amount 
to a Concession That Social Media is Connected to the 
Workplace? 
Some may argue that creating sexual harassment social media policies 
effectively forces the employer to concede that harassment on social media 
is connected to the workplace.  Unfortunately for employers, there is no 
 
 161  Joel S. Barras, Sara A. Begley, Amanda D. Haverstick & Divonne Smoyer, Perils and 
Pitfalls: Social Media Law and the Workplace 2, U.S. CHAMBER INST. OF LEGAL REFORM 
(2014). 
 162  Id. 
 163  See Kevin J. Jones & Lisa A. Mainiero, Sexual Harassment Versus Workplace 
Romance: Social Media Spillover and Textual Harassment in the Workplace, 27 ACAD. MGMT 
PERSP., 193–94 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amp.2012.0031 (citing many examples of 
company social media policies with broad language and a general warning not to discuss 
work-related matters online because the lines between personal and professional are often 
blurred when social media use is involved). 
 164  See Michelle Drouin, Kimberly W. O’Connor & Gordon B. Schmidt, Helping Workers 
Understand and Follow Social Media Policies, 59 BUS. HORIZONS 205, 208, 
www.elsevier.com/locate/bushor (last visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
 165  See infra Part VI.B.3 for a discussion about drafting sexual harassment social media 
policies in such a way so as to avoid violating section 7 rights of employees.   
 166  Ellison, Lampe & Olmstead, supra note 89. 
 167  Id.  
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denying that an employee’s actions on social media may be connected to the 
workplace.  The NLRB gives guidelines on social media policies, implying 
that social media can be connected to work.168  Employers themselves often 
create social media policies as preventative measures, and courts have even 
found that social media is connected to the workplace in some cases.169 
An employer who creates a social media sexual harassment policy does 
not, however, concede that social media harassment is in every instance 
connected to the workplace.  Policies that aim to inform employees about 
what type of conduct a court may find to be connected to the workplace are 
simply preventative measures to inform employees about conduct that may 
or may not be connected to the workplace. 
B. Employers Must Be Aware of When Liability May Arise 
Unfortunately, it is unclear when employer liability will arise because 
the Circuit Courts of Appeals disagree on the definition of the workplace.170  
In traditional claims, whether a court will expand workplace harassment 
claims beyond “the four walls of the workplace” will often depend on 
whether the conduct has consequences at work.171  But, as the case law 
illustrates, it is not clear what type of harassment outside of work courts will 
consider or how severe the consequences at work must be.  Thus, these 
questions are determinable only on a case-by-case basis. 
There is a similar lack of certainty for employee conduct online.  Blakey 
and Amira-Jabbar make clear that there is no bright-line rule to determine 
what type of social media forum may be considered.172  Blakey sets forth a 
“substantial benefits” test,173 which is also endorsed by some scholars as 
described above,174 where an employer will be liable if the forum is 
sufficiently related to the workplace, and the employer receives a substantial 
benefit from the forum.175  The court in Amira-Jabbar, however, was far less 
clear about why a post on a personal Facebook page was sufficiently related 
to the workplace so as to create employer liability.176  Thus, while the case 
 
 168  See supra Part IV.B. 
 169  See supra Part III.C.1. 
 170  See supra Part II.A.3; see also Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 
2000); Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Servs., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.P.R. 2010). 
 171  See supra Part II.A.3. 
 172  See generally Blakey, 751 A.2d 538; Amira-Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d 77. 
 173   Blakey, 751 A.2d at 551. 
 174  Cain & O’Brien, supra note 87; see also Gelms, supra note 14, at 275 (arguing that 
the standard for whether social media evidence should be considered in a sexual harassment 
claim should be based on whether the forum was sufficiently related to the workplace, which 
can be determined by whether the employer received a “substantial benefit” from the forum). 
 175  Gelms, supra note 14, at 275. 
 176  Id. at 271. 
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law demonstrates the prudence of monitoring any social networking site that 
could reasonably be connected to the workplace, Amira-Jabbar indicates 
that doing so will not ensure freedom from liability. 
The uncertainty about when liability will arise places the employer even 
more on the defensive.  As discussed in Part II.A.2., an employer will be 
liable for harassment by an employee’s co-worker if the employer knew, or 
should have known, of the harassment and did not take prompt and 
appropriate action to remedy the situation.177  In the context of social media 
harassment, however, whether the employer “should have known” of the 
harassment, i.e. that the forum is found to be sufficiently related to the 
workplace, is incredibly unclear.178  Therefore, social media sexual 
harassment policies must include specific steps employees should take to 
inform the employer when they are being sexually harassed online.179  A 
clear policy will help ensure that employees make the employer aware of 
instances of sexual harassment so that action can be taken.180  Essentially, 
the key is enacting a policy that makes employees comfortable coming 
forward, so that the employer stays informed and is never left defending why 
it should not have known of the conduct. 
C. Sexual Harassment Social Media Policies Must be Clear in 
Addressing What Constitutes Sexual Harassment on Social Media 
Employees must be made aware of what constitutes sexual harassment 
on social media not only so that potential perpetrators know when their 
conduct rises to the level of sexual harassment, but also so that a victim can 
identify harassment when it occurs.181  Despite extensive study and attention 
to workplace sexual harassment, not many people can identify sexual 
harassment when it occurs.182  The most successful harassment polices 
clearly define harassment, explain the options available to a harassment 
victim, and describe how the employer will act on a claim of sexual 
harassment.183  The position that social media sexual harassment policies 
must include procedures for resolving sexual harassment complaints aligns 
with the EEOC’s previous guidance that companies’ general sexual 
harassment policies should also include appropriate procedures.184 
 
 177  See supra Part II.A.2. (citing Enforcement Guidance, supra note 45). 
 178  Id. 
 179  See Blackstone, supra note 160. 
 180  Drouin, O’Connor & Schmidt, supra note 164. 
 181  Blackstone, supra note 160 (stating that not many people understand what sexual 
harassment is, or can identify it when it occurs). 
 182  Supra note 160. 
 183  Id. 
 184  See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 45 (stating that “employers should establish 
anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures covering all forms of unlawful 
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In Dowd v. United Steelworkers of America, the Eighth Circuit set forth 
a definition of harassment that employers can use as a model for defining 
online sexual harassment in their policies.185  The court defined unlawful 
sexual harassment as “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule or insult that is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 
employment and create an abusive working environment.”186  First, the court 
addressed what discrimination isfor the purposes of this Comment, it is 
online sexual harassment defined as sexual intimidation, ridicule, or insult.  
Second, and arguably more essential to an employer’s policy, the court stated 
that sexual harassment outside the workplace is actionable under Title VII if 
severe or pervasive enough that the employee feels the effects of the online 
harassment in the workplace.187 
Thus, a good policy will make it clear that employees and employers 
may be liable for words said online; and that if someone makes sexual 
comments online that are likely to produce a negative impact in the 
workplace, he or she will be held accountable.  Something else that can be 
drawn from the distinctionand that should be stated explicitly in a 
policyis that liability may arise regardless of who owns the device from 
which the harassment is carried out.188 
D. The Policy Must Use Language to Avoid Violating Employees’ 
Rights Under Section 7 of the NLRA 
In the context of both company social media policies and company 
sexual harassment policies, the Board takes the stance that employers must 
refrain from violating employees’ section 7 rights to engage in “concerted 
activity.”189  Therefore, when drafting social media sexual harassment 
policies, employers must draft policies that avoid “chilling” employees’ 
section 7 rights.190  As a reminder, section 7 protects an employee’s right to 
engage in “concerted activity,” which is defined as discussion between 
employees about any terms and conditions of employment, including wages, 
hours, union membership, and anything else that could reasonably be 
considered for the “mutual aid or protection” of employees.191 
 
harassment,” including sexual harassment, because of the possibility of vicarious liability). 
 185  Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., 253 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 186  Id.   
 187  Id. 
 188  Guarino, supra note 134. 
 189  See supra Part IV.B. 
 190  Id. 
 191  Gross, supra note 130. 
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E. Employers Must Adequately Communicate Policies to Employees 
Employers often have trouble adequately communicating both sexual 
harassment and social media policies.192  Thus, while this last warning may 
seem superfluous, it is apparently very necessary.  Effective communication 
can be achieved in many ways, including stressing that employees read and 
understand the policies, requiring signed policy acknowledgements (which 
will also help minimize employer liability if an action does arise), creating 
short summaries of policies that employees can easily reference, and even 
conducting training sessions designed to recognize and prevent sexual 
harassment on social media.193 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Now that social media is ingrained in our everyday lives, and has 
permeated the workplace so thoroughly, workplace harassment has 
expanded to social media at a rapid rate.  To combat this novel type of 
harassment, it is first paramount to educate employers about when they may 
be liable for employee sexual harassment and misconduct online, so that their 
policies accurately reflect the specific language and actions employees must 
avoid.  Because the scope of employer liability is so unclear after Blakey and 
Amira-Jabbar, employers must encourage employees to come forward with 
claims of harassment so that employers are on notice and can address such 
claims accordingly.  Employers must also enact policies that clearly and 
adequately explain what constitutes sexual harassment on social media, use 
language that appropriately balances the employers’ interests with 
employees’ section 7 rights, and adequately communicate their policies to 
their employees so that employees know a policy exists and can become 
familiar with its terms.  Social media only amplifies the problems of sexual 
harassment.  Thus, the time has come for employers to fulfill their duty to 
minimize workplace sexual harassment by enacting effective social media 
sexual harassment policies. 
 
 
 192  Bellstrom, supra note 160 (Jenny Yang, Chair of the EEOC, discussing that many 
employers are not communicating their sexual harassment policies well enough to workers—
especially temporary workers); Drouin, O’Connor & Schmidt, supra note 164, at 207 (finding 
in a study that 35% of people did not know that their company had a social media policy, and 
of the people that did know, 50% did not know what the policy said). 
 193  Drouin, O’Connor & Schmidt, supra note 164, at 209. 
